A Palestinian State?
As the United Nations prepares to debate Palestinian statehood, this seems an auspicious time to suggest a potential solution to this intractable conflict. The ideas underlying this proposal are drawn from a variety of sources, most notably from the writings of the late Baruch Kimmerling, a professor of sociology at the Hebrew University who proposed a two-state solution and the admission of both states to the European Union, and to Mark A. Levine, who argued for the creation of a state based on the Swiss model of cantons. It seems that both perspectives can be combined to creates a system that will have the best chance of gaining support from moderates on both sides.
Kimmerling's plan calls for a two-state solution rather than a one-state solution. In this way, both sides avoid living under the dominance of the “other” and the tragic violence that often accompanies it. Each people would have its own army and police force, an important point for both sides, albeit for different reasons.
In accordance with Kimmerling’s ideas, both Israel and the new Palestinian state should be admitted to the European Union. Although this will not happen until after Europe regains its economic equilibrium, such a step would benefit both sides. Since any citizen of an E.U. country can live in any other E.U. country, Palestinians could live in Israel while Israelis could live in Palestine. This proposal affords Palestinians a right of return but one that safeguards the existence of a sovereign Israeli state, since Palestinians living and working in Israel would not be citizens there, but in Palestine. Of course, if Palestine could join the E.U., tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees would no doubt move to, for example, Italy or England to work instead of remaining in refugee camps on Israel’s borders, a fact that would ease tensions in the region considerably.
Similarly, the hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers living on the West Bank would not be forced to leave homes that they have inhabited for years and, in some cases, for decades. While it is easy to stereotype settlers as kipah-wearing Kahanists, many are poor Israelis from Mizrachi communities who saw moving to the West Bank as their only opportunity to escape Israeli slums. This proposal protects their interests as well.
As Kimmerling points out, one of the major obstacles to a peace settlement is the fact that two relatively sizable populations lay claim to one relatively small peace of land. EU membership greatly increases the land on which both peoples could live and work, thus easing population pressures.
While Zionists of all stripes object to a Palestinian right of return, a genuine and lasting settlement is impossible without it, largely because Palestinians will not accept a solution that leaves millions of their kin in refugee camps. Then, there is the moral imperative: it is difficult to understand the position of people who claim a right of return after two thousand years but wish to deny this right to other people who have been absent only sixty-three years. It is even harder to accept the actions of the Israeli government when they grant admission to Russians who have no Jewish ancestry and who have never been persecuted as Jews while denying the right of return to people who were forced out of their homes by war. (If you doubt this, read Kimmerling's Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians for an account of events leading to the Nakba.) Then, too, if current birth rates continue, Palestinians will outnumber Israel within the 1967 borders sometime during this century. Barring massive immigration of Jews from Israel and Canada or ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, Jewish demographic dominance will cease. In this case, Israel will be in the position of white South Africans and will be forced into major concessions. It seems better for Israelis to negotiate a settlement now, one that includes a right of return, from a position of relative strength than to wait until their backs are against the wall.
While a two-state solution provides a model for the larger political questions, the Swiss system of cantons provides a model for organizing the internal politics of each state. The idea of giving a relatively high level of power to decentralized local communities has two advantages for Israelis.
The first is that Israelis would have less to fear from the “demographic bomb” as Israeli Arabs become more numerous due to their somewhat higher birthrate. Under this system, Arabs in the Galilee would have little say in the affairs of Jews living in Tel Aviv. All communities would still retain substantial levels of control over their own affairs, something that would be more difficult under a highly centralized political system.
The second is that the canton system could potentially ease the second most contentious issue in Israeli politics—the tension between the secular and the religious. Under this system, citizens living in secular cantons could spend their Saturdays enjoying cultural opportunities—and spend Yom Kippur on the beach in their bikinis—while citizens of religious cantons could enjoy the peace of Shabbat and the company of modestly dressed women wearing marriage wigs.
One of the strongest features of the canton system is that these political units can be subdivided should the need arise. If, for example, Russian and Moroccan Jews want separate cantons, this remains possible. Similarly, cantons could theoretically unite when conditions change.
While there are no perfect solutions to nasty ethnic conflicts over territory, the combination of a two-state solution, E.U. membership, and local autonomy on the Swiss model offers hope for ameliorating the worst features of this ongoing tragedy. The ideas of Kimmerling and Magnes combine the best features of both the one-state and two-state solutions in that they allow each side to have its own state while protecting the interests of both Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlers who, although they acted wrongly in settling the West Bank, nevertheless have deep roots there.
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Even though I have a deep sympathy for the Palestinians, I haven't followed this issue closely since the start of the Iraq War in 2003 -- something about the beam in America's eye and the mote in Israel's eye. As much as I don't like what happens in Israel/Palestine, what America is doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Pakistan and probably other places I don't know about is far worse than what Israel is doing.
Nevertheless, I have written some ideas about what an "ideal" peace plan would look like, although I offer it knowing that it is more ideal for the Palestinians than for the Israelis.